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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests whether there exists any significant difference in the 
responsiveness of UK government expenditure policy to changes in national 
income and unemployment in pre- and post-election periods. The absence of 
such a political effect would see the national income and unemployment 
elasticities for government expenditure being uniform over an election period. 
The empirical analysis deliberately covers the three UK Conservative 
governments between 1979 and 1992 when academic debate on the 
implications of discretionary policy for the economy and social welfare were 
particularly prominent and when it appeared that political rhetoric concurred 
with the academic prescriptions. 
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 I  INTRODUCTION 
Macroeconomics has been enriched over the last twenty years or so by its 
modelling of the interaction of political and economic agents. For instance, 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) demonstrate how 
inflation policy announcements can lack credibility because of the policy-
maker’s temptation to generate surprise inflation. Consequently, the possible 
electoral benefits for governments in inducing surprise inflation lead to what 
has been termed an inflation bias or an excessive level of inflation. 
Simultaneously, work under the broad heading of “political business cycles” 
has also focused more generally on the economic implications of political 
objectives, both opportunistic and ideological. Perhaps, the best known model 
is that of Nordhaus (1975) who also highlights the gains from an expanding 
economy prior to election and shows how a government may be led to create a 
boom-bust cycle over the course of an election period. 
This paper is concerned with a particular aspect of what can be called 
‘political macroeconomics’. We will focus on the potential role of politics in 
shaping government expenditure regimes. This is important to economists 
because politically motivated policy formulation has important welfare 
implications. This is a crucial concern in much of the political macroeconomics 
literature. This paper thus seeks to empirically test whether such concerns are 
justified by considering Conservative UK government expenditure policy 
between 1979 and 19921. 
The political macroeconomic models of Frey (1978), Frey and Schneider 
(1978), Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) explicitly relate 
government expenditures to political variables. The Frey-Schneider analysis 
models regimes switches in government expenditures as dependent upon the 
government’s perceived electoral security, where electoral security is the 
                                              
1 A non-linear analysis of total government expenditure for this period using a non-linear switching 
model is found in Easaw and Garratt (1998)   
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government’s popularity standing discounted by the time to an election. The 
closer an election the more important becomes the government’s perceived re-
election likelihood. In the Rogoff-Sibert models governments attempt to signal 
their administrative competence to the electorate by appearing to deliver a 
“healthy” provision of public goods and services at the lowest possible tax 
price. Its willingness to resort to post-election seignorage and/or bias 
expenditures in the pre-election period towards those expenditures which can 
be consumed more immediately is the result of an informational asymmetry. 
The public are only aware of the government’s true administrative competence 
in the following period with higher inflation and consequent seignorage 
revenues. Therefore, these political macroeconomic models identify the 
possible influence of elections in shaping government expenditure policy. We 
will consider this particular influence for the three election periods from 1979 
to 1992.  
The choice of this time period is quite deliberate since the period 
coincides with the heightened debate in academic circles over discretionary 
economic powers. The likes of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) explicitly warned of the effects of governments using demand 
management policies to increase their own level of welfare given the potential 
response of private agents to such policies. Whilst the government could not 
hope to affect unemployment or output, for anything other than a transitory 
period, the political cost of discretionary economic policy would manifest itself 
in inflation bias. Consequently, both the government and the public alike 
would be the losers of discretionary demand management policies. As Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988) observe from their model, once you increase the weight that 
policy-maker’s give to reputation and social welfare considerations the less 
frequently policy cycles should occur. Alesina and Perotti (1995) conclude that 
there has been a marked move away in the political business literature from the 
boom-bust cycles of Nordhaus (1975) as a result of models including 
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reputation building. Therefore, electoral policy cycles ‘should be observed only 
occasionally and should not be very large’ (p. 235). 
The rhetoric of the UK’s Conservative government appeared, on the 
surface at least, to reflect the concerns of the reputation and credibility 
literature. Indeed, Backus and Driffill (1986) claim that the fall in UK inflation 
in the 1980s reflected the determination of the UK Conservative government to 
pursue “hard-nosed” and, therefore, credible economic policies aimed at 
reducing inflation. Our primary question is whether such rhetoric was actually 
supported by their actions in relation to government expenditure policy. 
In modelling UK government expenditure we attempt to identify whether 
there exist two expenditure states dependent upon the time to the next election. 
In particular, we consider whether there exists any difference in the long-run 
elasticities of government expenditures with respect to national income and 
unemployment in the pre- and post-election periods or whether the elasticities 
are uniform over the entire period. A significant difference would suggest that 
politics has affected this important area of economic policy while a uniformity 
in the elasticities across the election period would suggest that this aspect of 
politics has not influenced the determination of government expenditures. The 
essence of our analysis is the responsiveness of government to these economic 
variables pre- and post-election. Consequently, the analysis allows explicitly 
for a supply-side effect in modelling government expenditures. 
Drawing on the Frey-Schneider and Rogoff-Sibert approaches we use our 
analysis to consider: 
(i) whether total government expenditure is more responsive to changes in 
national income and unemployment in pre-election periods. 
(ii) whether transfer and exhaustive government expenditures are more 
responsive to changes in unemployment and/or national income in pre-election 
periods. 
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(iii) following (ii), whether there is any asymmetry in the behaviour of transfer 
and exhaustive expenditures across election periods. 
In section 2 of the paper we define those components of government 
expenditures on which the empirical analysis is based. Section 3 begins by 
detailing the error correction model employed to test UK government 
expenditure policy for the effect of elections, before presenting the findings of 
the empirical analysis. Finally, section 4 aims to draw some conclusions from 
our findings. 
 
II  UK GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1979-1992 
The empirical analysis focuses on three categories of government 
expenditures: total (less net lending), transfers and exhaustive. We have used 
total expenditures less net lending in order to avoid working with an 
inconsistent data series that would arise by including the privatisation receipts 
as negative expenditures in the net lending component (See Bailey, Chapter 11, 
1995). Between 1979(2) and 1992(1) the mean quarterly growth rate of total 
expenditure less net lending was 0.52% which was larger than 0.46% for the 
economy as a whole.2 Total expenditure to GDP at factor cost averaged 50.1%. 
The breakdown of the mean quarterly growth rates for total government 
expenditure and GDP for each individual election period and for the first and 
second halves of these election periods is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
                                              
2 The importance of privatisation receipts is obvious when one looks at the average quarterly growth 
rate of total expenditures inclusive of net lending (privatisation receipts are included as negative 
expenditure within net lending). In this case the quarter to quarter growth rate averages 0.35% and is 
thus less than the mean growth rate of the economy over this period. 
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As well as focusing upon the sum of government expenditures we also 
analyse the effect of elections on the long-run relationship between current and 
capital transfer expenditures and both factor GDP and unemployment and that 
between exhaustive expenditures and factor GDP. Current transfers are 
predominantly grants to the personal sector in the form of national insurance 
benefits. They also include subsidies and grants paid abroad. Capital transfers 
are largely investment grants. Exhaustive expenditure is the sum of 
consumption and investment expenditures and is thus expenditure on goods 
and services. Consumption expenditures are those on current inputs used in the 
production of public sector output, of which over half is on public sector 
employees’ wages and salaries. Investment relates to expenditures on fixed 
assets such as land, buildings and machinery. 
The average quarterly growth rate of real current and capital transfers 
over the sample period 1979(2) to 1992(1) was 0.68% compared to 0.52% for 
total expenditure (less net lending). In contrast, the mean growth rate for 
exhaustive expenditures was 0.39% and thus less than that for total 
expenditures. Table 2 shows the growth rates for these two expenditure 
components over the three election periods. 
Table 2 here 
Figure 1 plots the quarterly growth rate for the three measures of real 
government expenditure, with the individual election periods indicated. 
               Figure 1 here   
Exhaustive expenditures remain the largest component of UK government 
expenditure. Over our sample period of 1979(2) to 1992(1) exhaustive 
expenditure averaged 56.0% of total government expenditure while current and 
capital transfers averaged 36.5%. 
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III  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Empirical model 
The hypothesis to be tested is that there are two states of government 
expenditure associated with pre- and post-election periods. The equations 
estimated are log-linearised therefore enabling us to infer the responsiveness of 
government expenditure to national income (Wagner’s Law)3 and 
unemployment. We subsequently examine any differences in the long-run 
elasticities of government expenditure between the two regimes. 
An error correction model is employed to test government expenditures. 
An error correction model in logarithm allows us to estimate both the growth 
rates and dynamic elasticities. From the dynamic elasticities, we can derive the 
long-run elasticities for both pre- and post-election periods. Then we can look 
for possible significant differences in long-run elasticities pre- and post-
election. Consequently, we are able to distinguish between regime shifts in the 
long-run dynamic relationship and differences in the trend of the steady state or 
equilibrium path. Identifying this distinction would be useful in light of the 
views expressed in Rogoff and Siebert (1988) and Alesina and Perroti (1995) 
that electoral policy cycles may only be observed occasionally and not very 
large.   
We have omitted the unemployment variable from the exhaustive 
expenditures equation because the composition of exhaustive expenditures 
does not suggest an obviously strong relationship. This was confirmed by 
statistical tests showing there to be no significant long-run relationship between 
unemployment and exhaustive expenditures (see below). Furthermore, this is 
consistent with the consumption and investment expenditure equations 
estimated by Frey and Schneider (1978). 
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The pre-election period is defined as either 4, 6, 8, 10 or 12 quarters up to 
and including the election quarter itself. We include the government’s 
popularity lead as a control variable since the effect of elections could be 
tempered somewhat by the government’s popularity standing. However, it is 
our contention that elections have their own unique effect on policy-making 
even when allowing for popularity. The popularity lead variable is taken from 
replies to the Gallup survey as to which party an individual would vote if there 
were a general election tomorrow. It is the difference between those that 
expressed a preference for the incumbent Conservatives and those Labour. 
The linear error correction model takes the following general form :4 
Δ Δ Δlg lgi t t i t tt tly lu ly lu= + +α α α + α + +− − −α α  0 1 2 3 4 1 5 11
+ +β β + β + +− −β β0 1 2 3 4 11d d ly d lu d d lyt t t t t t i t tt( * ) ( * ) ( * lg ) ( * )Δ Δ
 + +β α + ε−5 1 6( * )d lu leadt t t t
                                                                                                                                 
      
           (1) 
gi  measure i of government expenditures (all in 1990 prices and seasonally 
adjusted). 
 y    factor GDP (1990 prices, seasonally adjusted);   
u    unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted);  
d    dummy variable. This takes a value of 0 in the defined post-election 
period. The dummy takes a value of 1 in the n quarters up to and 
including the election quarter. 
l g l g tl y l y l u l u l e a d= + +
3 See Wagner (1883) articulated that total government expenditure in developing economies would 
have an income elasticity in excess of unity. Wagner’s Law is often cited in explaining the increasing 
share of government expenditure in national income. 
4 When the dummy variable this is equivalent to dt = 0
t t t t t tδ δ + + + +− − −δ δ δ δ δ0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 1 6  
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lead  Conservative government’s popularity lead over Labour. 
Δ represents the difference operator. 
We are thus able to define two expenditure regimes. These are: 
 
regime 1: (dt = 0) 
Δ Δ Δlg lgi t t i t t t tt tly lu ly lu lead= + +α α α + α + + + +− − −α α α ε  0 1 2 3 4 1 5 1 61
Δ
           (2) 
regime 2: (dt = 1) 
Δ Δlg ( ) ( )i t tt ly lu= + + +α β α β + α + β0 0 1 2 21
+ + +
 
 + + + + +− − −( ) lg ( ) ( )α β α β α β α ε3 3 4 4 1 5 5 1 61i t t t tt ly l u lead
           (3) 
The time-varying slope enables us to test whether the both the growth 
rates and long-run relationship between government expenditures and 
unemployment or GDP is affected by the time to the next election or whether 
the elasticities of government expenditure are uniform over an election period. 
However, in the exhaustive expenditures model the unemployment terms drop 
out and the long-run relationship of interest is solely with GDP.  
Furthermore, the long-run elasticities can be calculated and estimated as: 
αη α
αy
= − 4
3
η and  αu = −
5
3
 in post-election regime    (4) 
η α ββαy = −
+
+
4 4
33
and  η
α β
βαu = −
+
+
5 5
33
 in pre-election regime  (5) 
Subsequently, the difference between the two long-run elasticities are 
estimated to establish whether there is a difference in the trend of the 
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steady state or equilibrium path of the long-run relationship between 
the respective variables5.  
The Dickey Fuller Tests show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
g, y  and u  series have a unit root. These series are found to be I(1). However, 
we can reject the null hypothesis for a unit root for the popularity lead series at 
the 5% level. Consequently, a residual-based cointegration test is undertaken 
for the estimated error-correction models. It is based on the critical values as 
provided in MacKinnon (1991). Gregory and Hansen (1996) argue that these 
are satisfactory critical values in establishing long-run relationships in the data, 
even in the presence of regime shifts (p. 117).   
Results 
In this sub-section we estimate the error-correction model for total 
government expenditures (less net lending), current and capital transfers, and 
exhaustive expenditures. For total expenditures and transfer expenditures we 
proceed to show the inferred long-run relationship with both factor GDP and 
unemployment, while in the case of exhaustive expenditures we look at the 
long-run relationship with GDP only. In each case the fundamental question is 
whether there is significant evidence that GDP and/or unemployment has a 
larger influence on government expenditures when closer to an election. 
However, in order to have a benchmark with which to compare the elasticities 
in the pre- and post-election periods we have estimated each of the three 
expenditure models before allowing for any possible effect of elections. Thus, 
we estimated models equivalent to equation (2). The regressions for each 
expenditure type are in shown in table 3. 
  
                                              
5 Gregory et al (1996), confirming the position of Zivot and Andrews (1992), state that a joint null 
hypothesis using an F stat, or equivalent the Wald stat, in a cointegrated relationship has the 
disadvantage that the power may be low and the chi squared critical values biased against the null 
hypothesis. Hence, we just use the estimated difference to determine whether there is a significant 
differences in the trend of the equilibrium path . 
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Table 3 here 
 
The dynamic elasticities indicate that only exhaustive expenditures 
respond positively and significantly to the growth rate of GDP, whereas all the 
expenditures considered respond positively and significantly to the level of 
GDP. Total expenditures respond positively and significantly to both the level 
and growth rate of unemployment whereas transfers respond significantly only 
to the growth rate of unemployment. The government’s popularity lead is not 
found to have a significant relationship with government expenditures over the 
period of Conservative rule in the UK from 1979 to 1992. 
The inferred long-run elasticities with respect to income (ηy) and 
unemployment (ηu)  are shown in table 4. The figures in parenthesis are 
absolute t-values. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
The income elasticities, while positive, do not support the hypothesis that 
public expenditures are luxury or superior goods and, thus, do not support 
Wagner’s Law. However, Wagner’s analysis was never intended to be 
interpreted strictly as a ‘law’ and, moreover, was directed towards the 
industrialisation stage of an economy’s development. The income elasticities 
infer that a 1% increase in real national income results in real transfer and 
exhaustive expenditures increasing by just over half a percentage point, but 
total expenditures by one-quarter of a percentage point. The unemployment 
elasticities infer that a 1% increase in the rate of unemployment increases real 
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transfer expenditures by one-fifth of a percentage point and total expenditures 
by less than one-thirteenth of a percentage point.6 
 
Total Expenditure and Time to the Next Election 
We now examine whether proximity or time to a general election results 
in a pre- and post-election total expenditure regime. Table 5 shows the results 
from the Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the error correction model 
(equation 1) for total UK government expenditure. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
LEAD is insignificant in all variants of the total government expenditure 
model. The estimated dynamic elasticities are now distinguished according to 
pre- and post-election. Total expenditures do not respond significantly to 
national income  growth rates in these two periods. However, they appear to 
respond significantly and positively to the level of national income in the pre-
election period as defined by 8, 10 and 12 quarters up to the election. The 
growth rate of unemployment is seen to be insignificant in both pre- and post-
election periods, while the level of unemployment has a positive impact on 
total expenditures in the post-election period. 
Table 6 shows the results relating to the long-run elasticities for total 
government expenditures derived from the estimated dynamic elasticities. For 
each long-run relationship the first line of results relate to the period furthest 
from the election when the dummy equals zero, while the second line is for the 
n quarters up to the election. If the elasticity prior to the election is greater 
                                              
6 When the appropriate model for exhaustive expenditures is estimated the unemployment elasticity is 
found to be 0.04 with a calculated t-ratio of 1.11 and thus statistically insignificant. 
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(less) than in the post-election period, the difference between the two will be 
some negative (positive) number. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
The results show significant evidence that the proximity of an election has 
impacted on the relationship between national income and government 
expenditure. This is not true of the relationship between unemployment and 
government expenditure. The hypothesis that the elasticity of government 
expenditure with respect to income in the ten or twelve quarters up to the 
election is different to that in the remainder of the election period is statistically 
significant at the 2.5% and 10% levels respectively. This is consistent with the 
dynamic elasticities. The magnitudes indicate that the income elasticity of total 
government expenditures is larger in the pre- as opposed to post-election 
periods. This amounts to between a three-tenths of one percent to a full one 
percent extra increase in real total expenditures for a 1% increase in real 
national income prior to an election. Indeed, the model where n = 12 indicates 
that in the more immediate aftermath of an election the elasticity of total 
expenditure with respect to national income was negative. 
 The unemployment elasticity of total government expenditure is constant 
across election periods. This is perhaps because the effect of unemployment on 
government expenditures is essentially demand-driven. Governments appear 
both unable and unwilling to respond differently to unemployment changes 
across an election period. Greater generosity in the coverage of benefits or the 
levels of benefits themselves imply more pressure on government’s budget 
constraint, and in the case of coverage more entitlements in the future. It is 
easier, in political terms, to extend benefit coverage than to reduce it. 
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Furthermore, with regards to the level of benefits the recent experience in the 
UK has been to index them to the retail price index.  
 
Transfers and Time to the Next Election 
We now examine whether time to the next election has influenced the 
GDP and unemployment elasticities for transfer expenditures. 
Table 7 shows the full set of regression results from estimating the error 
correction model for transfer expenditures. 
  
Table 7 here 
 
The government’s popularity lead is typically found not to exert a 
significant impact on transfer expenditures, the exception being the 8 quarter 
variant. The growth rates of national income and unemployment similarly do 
not exhibit a significant relationship, except for the former in the post-election 
period in 8 quarter variant. The levels of national income and unemployment 
have a significantly positive post-election relationship with transfers in the 4 
and 6 quarter variants. The level of national income has a significantly positive 
relationship in the pre-election period again in the 8 quarter variant. 
Table 8 shows the long-run elasticities consistent with the estimated 
dynamic elasticities. 
 
Table 8 here 
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 The long-run elasticities are consistent with the dynamic elasticities. In 
the 8 quarter model the income elasticity is significantly larger in the pre-
election period. The difference amounts to close on an extra four-tenths of one 
percent increase in transfers in the pre-election period for a 1% rise in real 
national income. Again, the unemployment elasticity is found to be uniform 
across election periods. 
 
Exhaustive Expenditures and Time to the Next Election  
The largest part of government expenditure is on exhaustive expenditures. 
The final set of tests considers the possible impact of the time to the next 
election on exhaustive expenditures. The full set of regressions results are 
shown in table 9 below. 
 
Table 9 here 
 
The estimated dynamic elasticities show that exhaustive expenditures are 
not significantly responsive to national income growth rates. However, these 
expenditures respond significantly to the level of national income in the post-
election period in the 4, 6 and 8 quarter model variants. The popularity lead 
variable is insignificant except in the 10 quarter model where it is significantly 
negative and thus consistent with electoral security exerting downward 
influence on expenditures. 
Table 10 shows the estimated long-run elasticities from the dynamic 
elasticities. 
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Table 10 here 
 
 There is evidence that the elasticity of exhaustive expenditures with 
respect to national income was significantly influenced by the proximity of a 
forthcoming election. In the 10 and 12 quarter model variants the income 
elasticity of exhaustive expenditures is significantly different to the remainder 
of the period at the 1% level. Once more, the income elasticity of expenditure 
is larger in the pre-election period. The difference amounts to close on a four-
tenths of one percent extra increase in real exhaustive expenditures for a 1% 
rise in real national income. 
IV  CONCLUSIONS 
The implication of time inconsistency and credibility in macroeconomic 
policy is that governments which practise discretionary economic policy can 
cause excessive inflation without any reduction in unemployment. Therefore, 
governments can increase both their own welfare and that of private agents by 
committing themselves to economic rules and resisting the temptation to allow 
politics to affect their economic policy-making. The present paper empirically 
analysed UK government expenditure behaviour in the 1980s, and whether 
their hard-line position in fiscal policy was influenced by electoral 
considerations. We focused on the elasticity of three measures of real 
government expenditures with respect to real national income and the rate of 
unemployment over three election periods. A summary of the findings with 
respect to these elasticities is shown Table 11. 
 
Table 11 here 
 
There is evidence to support the hypothesis that the income elasticity in 
all our expenditure models was larger in the pre-election phase. This seems 
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particularly apparent approximately two and half years prior to an election, or 
the latter half of a UK election period. The effect amounts typically to between 
an extra one-third and four-tenths of one percentage point increase in 
expenditures following a 1% increase in national income, although in the total 
expenditures model there is evidence that in the immediate aftermath of an 
election the income elasticity was negative so that the effect is larger at nearer 
an extra one-percentage point.  
Whereas government expenditure policy is seen to respond differently to 
national income pre- and post-election, the effect of unemployment, while 
significant in determining in total and transfer expenditures, appears to be 
uniform over an election period. 
We posed three questions at the outset of this paper in relation to long-run 
elasticities. In response we have found: 
(i) total government expenditure is more responsive to national income in pre-
election periods, but not to unemployment where the response is uniform 
across the whole election period. 
(ii) transfer and exhaustive expenditures are more responsive to changes in 
national income in pre-election periods. Transfer expenditures responded 
uniformly to unemployment across election periods, while there is no 
significant long-term relationship between exhaustive expenditures and 
unemployment. 
(iii) from (ii) it appears that transfer and exhaustive expenditures respond 
similarly to national income since, in each case, the long-run elasticity is 
larger in pre-election periods. 
The present analysis indicates that there is a significant difference in the trend 
of the steady-state and equilibrium path between pre and post election periods. 
However, with the of exception total expenditures, there are no significant 
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differences between growth rates and dynamic elasticities in pre and post 
election periods. This would suggest that while the incumbent government did 
not react dynamically to electoral cycles, there is significant change in the long 
run trend. This, together with the insignificant re-election indicators, gives 
some credence to the position expressed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Alesina and Perroti (1995) that there is a movement away from the traditional 
boom-bust framework as in the 1980s UK governments did not react 
dynamically to impending elections. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence 
in the present analysis that show that the UK government expenditure types in 
the 1980s have significantly changed their long-run steady-state or equilibrium 
path with respect to electoral cycles. 
The idea that government expenditure policy is affected by electoral 
expediency is not a new one. However, developments in macroeconomics over 
the last twenty years have demonstrated the possible pitfalls for governments, 
particularly in relation to credibility and the associated inflation bias.  In this 
paper by empirically testing for the existence of two expenditure regimes 
determined by the proximity of an election, there is evidence to support that in 
recent British political history government expenditure has been affected by 
political motives. While government may have appeared to have accepted the 
pitfalls identified by the emerging new classical macroeconomic literature, this 
acceptance was at best a mere appreciation in relation to government 
expenditure policy and an appreciation that would seem to have been ignored. 
Politics continues to matter. 
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Table 1. Quarterly growth in government expenditure (G) and GDP (Y) 
    
Election Average First half Second half 
Period G Y G Y G Y 
79(2)-83(2) 0.776 0.238 0.582  -0.208 0.949 0.636 
83(3)-87(2) -0.077 0.899 -0.060  0.867 -0.094 0.931 
87(3)-92(1) 0.798 0.280 0.865 0.881 0.736 -0.262 
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Table 2. Quarterly growth in transfers (T) and exhaustive expenditures (E) 
    
Election Average First half Second half 
Period T E T E T E  
79(2)-83(2) 0.812 0.318 0.676 0.123 0.933 0.491 
83(3)-87(2) 0.571 0.172 0.760 0.124 0.382 0.220 
87(3)-92(1) 0.664 0.627 -0.093 0.531 1.346 0.713 
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FIGURE 1:QUARTERLY GROWTH RATE OF
EXPENDITURES
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Table 3. Government Expenditures; Sample 1979(3)-1992(1) 
        
 Total  Transfers  Exhaustive  
int ercept
Δly
Δlu
lg( )−1
ly( )−1
lu( )−1
LEAD
 9.8563   2.2339  0.8835 
 (7.25) * (2.67) * (1.48)  
 -0.1981  0.1928  -0.5206 
 (0.22)  (0.21)  (1.84) + 
 0.2401  0.0609   
 (2.03) * (0.50)   
 -1.2939  -0.7817  -0.2142 
 (8.84) * (5.14) * (2.32) * 
 0.3450  0.4451  0.1144 
 (4.94) * (4.13) * (2.72) * 
 0.0994  0.1566   
 (3.63) * (3.99) *  
 -0.0007  -0.0014  0.0003 
 (0.87)  (1.56)  (0.90)  
adjusted  0.60  0.30  0.10  R2
RSS 0.0625  0.0664  0.0118  
Log-likelihood 98.5816  97.0525  140.9370  
DW 1.96  1.80  2.21  
SC(4) 0.71  3.49  2.65  
FF(1) 3.47  1.88  0.29  
N(2) 2.54  5.38  5.58  
H(1) 0.87  0.42  0.01  
DF(res) 6.88 * 6.64 * 7.86 * 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are (absolute) t-values.  
 DF relates to test of non-stationarity in the regression residuals 
 * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test  
 + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
 SC, FF, N, relates to tests of serial correlation, functional form and heteroskedasticity which 
 follows a χ 2 distribution 
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Table 4: Elasticity of Government Expenditures 
 
Expenditure ηηy  u  
Total 0.2666 
(5.67)* 
0.0768 
(4.00)* 
Transfers 0.5695 
(7.12)* 
0.2004 
(6.11)* 
Exhaustive 0.5343 
(4.33)* 
 
Note:  * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test 
 26
Table 5. Total Expenditure and Time; Sample 1979(3)-1992(1) 
        
 4qtrs  6qtrs  8qtrs  10qtrs  12qtrs 
int ercept
Δly
Δlu
lg( )−1
ly( )−1
lu( )−1
TIME
Δ E
Δlu TIME*
lg( ) *−1 TIME
ly TIME( )*−1
lu TIME( )*−1
LEAD
 8.8507   10.5926  13.6168  13.6420    17.4184 
 (4.89) * (4.55) * (2.97) * (4.01) * (3.50) * 
 0.8114  0.7550  0.7107  -0.1796  3.1308 
 (0.75)  (0.68)  (0.52)  (0.12)  (1.04) 
 0.2494  0.1203  0.0883  0.1106  -1.9258 
 (1.50)  (0.62)  (0.44)  (0.38)  (1.81) + 
 -1.1665  -1.2190  -0.9902  -1.3388  -0.9421 
 (6.72) * (6.36) * (3.70) * (4.59) * (2.46) * 
 0.3164  0.2142  0.1353  0.0569  -0.6411 
 (3.31) * (1.79) + (1.08)  (0.36)  (1.71) + 
 0.0744  0.0791  0.0659  0.1100  0.0619 
 (2.33) * (2.33) * (1.68)  (2.63) * (0.84)  
 1.7716  -0.4137  1.3994  -3.6962  -7.7653 
 (0.53)  (0.13)  (0.40)  (1.00)  (1.50)  
 -3.7780  -2.5346  -0.3453  0.9327  -3.1804 ly TIM*
 (1.67)  (1.21)  (0.18)  (0.48)  (1.01) 
 0.4921  0.1897  0.1859  0.0824  2.1822 
 (0.81)  (0.51)  (0.66)  (0.25)  (2.04) * 
 -0.2095  -0.2703  -0.5543  -0.1294  -0.4133 
 (0.51)  (0.77)  (1.64)  (0.38)  (1.00) 
 0.0024  0.2715  0.3936  0.4456  1.0612 
 (0.01)  (1.41)  (2.27) * (2.41) * (2.76) * 
 0.2168  0.1002  0.0331  -0.0185  0.0395 
 (1.28)  (1.26)  (0.58)  (0.34)  (0.50) 
 0.0007  0.0007  -0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0002 
 (0.63)  (0.80)  (1.12)  (0.11)  (0.17) 
adjusted  0.59  0.59  0.61  0.64  0.63  R2
RSS 0.0552  0.0552  0.0539  0.0485  0.0504  
Log-likelihood 101.7456  101.7829  102.3385  105.0747  104.0983 
DW 2.03  1.97  2.08  2.24  2.05 
SC(4) 3.08  0.46  1.97  9.18  0.40  
FF(1) 6.10  5.88  0.02  1.87  0.58  
N(2) 2.39  4.18  2.89  10.90  5.60  
H(1) 0.99  0.93  0.49  1.31  1.60  
DF(res) 7.15 * 6.89 * 7.28 * 7.90 * 7.19 * 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are (absolute) t-values.  
 DF relates to test of non-stationarity in the regression residuals 
 * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test  
 + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
 SC, FF, N, relates to tests of serial correlation, functional form and heteroskedasticity which 
 follows a χ 2 distribution 
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Table 6. Elasticities from Total Government Expenditure Model 
           
 4qtrs  6qtrs  8qtrs  10qtrs  12qtrs  
 
 0.2713  0.1757  0.1146  0.0425  -0.6804 
 (3.45) * (1.78)+ (0.93)  (0.37)  (1.25)  η y
 0.2317  0.3261  0.3259  0.3423  0.3100 
 (2.03) * (4.46) * (5.49) * (6.39) * (5.94) * 
 0.0304  -0.1504  -0.2113  -0.3000  -0.9904 d ifference
 (0.76)  (1.29)  (1.56)  (2.35) * (1.81)+ 
      
 0.0637  0.0649  0.0777  0.0822  0.0657 
 (2.62) * (2.63) * (2.47) * (3.48) * (1.04)  ηu
 0.2116  0.1204  0.0764  0.0623  0.0748 
 (1.43)  (2.10) * (2.58) * (2.36) * (3.20) * 
 -0.1478  -0.0556  0.0013  0.0198  -0.0091 difference
 (0.98)  (0.89)  (0.03)  (0.59)  (0.14)  
Note:  * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test 
  + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
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Table 7. Transfers and Time; Sample 1979(3)-1992(1) 
        
 4qtrs  6qtrs  8qtrs  10qtrs  12qtrs 
int ercept
Δly
Δlu
lg( )−1
ly( )−1
lu( )−1
TIME
Δ E
Δlu TIME*
lg( ) *−1 TIME
ly TIME( )*−1
lu TIME( )*−1
LEAD
 2.3947   3.3772  3.6810  5.2677  4.0183   
 (2.00) * (2.21) * (1.96) + (2.05) * (0.76)  
 1.1800  1.0351  2.8529  2.0989  4.8088 
 (1.03)  (0.88)  (2.06) * (0.98)  (1.41) 
 0.1049  0.0064  0.1587  0.1054  0.3735 
 (0.60)  (0.03)  (0.85)  (0.34)  (0.31)  
 -0.7976  -0.8047  -0.5928  -0.7873  -0.6842 
 (4.39) * (4.39) * (2.05) * (1.84) + (1.21)  
 0.4463  0.3661  0.1664  0.1861  0.2185 
 (3.08) * (2.22) * (1.02)  (0.73)  (0.51)  
 0.1464  0.1541  0.1121  0.1594  0.0857 
 (3.01) * (3.08) * (1.50)  (1.49)  (0.56)  
 -0.3293  -1.8962  -1.6576  -3.1206  -2.1735 
 (0.16)  (0.96)  (0.80)  (1.13)  (0.40)  
 -3.5677  -2.4986  -2.9346  -2.3036  -5.2162 ly TIM*
 (1.56)  (1.16)  (1.56)  (0.92)  (1.46) 
 -0.1246  0.0038  -0.4669  -0.2301  -0.3342 
 (0.20)  (0.01)  (1.77) + (0.66)  (0.28)  
 0.1720  0.0162  -0.4997  -0.0624  -0.0522 
 (0.40)  (0.04)  (1.45)  (0.14)  (0.10) 
 -0.1260  0.1410  0.5601  0.3269  0.2213 
 (0.35)  (0.44)  (2.42) * (1.09)  (0.49)  
 0.0495  0.0515  0.0598  -0.0109  0.0741 
 (0.28)  (0.50)  (0.72)  (0.10)  (0.48) 
 -0.0016  -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0012  -0.0015 
 (1.40)  (1.48)  (1.77) + (1.27)  (1.44) 
adjusted  0.24  0.25  0.48  0.35  0.29  R2
RSS 0.0619  0.0611  0.0425  0.0533  0.0582  
Log-likelihood 98.8473  99.1784  108.4459  102.6362  100.4084 
DW 1.82  1.82  1.67  1.88  1.98 
SC(4) 6.13  3.63  8.02  6.48  4.95  
FF(1) 1.12  0.61  0.08  2.19  4.04  
N(2) 3.26  6.93  0.75  4.33  11.00  
H(1) 0.16  0.48  0.01  0.07  0.53  
DF(res) 6.68 * 6.81 * 6.19 * 6.90 * 7.04 * 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are (absolute) t-values.  
 DF relates to test of non-stationarity in the regression residuals 
 * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test  
 + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
 SC, FF, N, relates to tests of serial correlation, functional form and heteroskedasticity which 
 follows a χ 2 distribution 
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Table 8. Elasticities from Transfer Expenditure Model 
           
 4qtrs  6qtrs  8qtrs  10qtrs  12qtrs  
 
 0.5595  0.4550  0.2807  0.2363  0.3193 
η  (4.66) * (2.88) * (1.40)  (0.99)  (0.57) y
 0.5120  0.6432  0.6650  0.6037  0.5972 
 (1.84)+ (4.34) * (8.77) * (6.08) * (5.79) * 
 0.0475  -0.1882  -0.3843  -0.3674  -0.2779 difference
 (0.16)  (0.90)  (1.80)+ (1.42)  (0.48)  
      
 0.1836  0.1915  0.1891  0.2024  0.1252 
η  (4.85) * (4.87) * (3.50) * (4.40) * (0.94) u
 0.3133  0.2607  0.1573  0.1747  0.2170 
 (1.05)  (2.41) * (4.11) * (3.58) * (4.58) * 
 -0.1297  -0.0693  0.0318  0.0277  -0.0918 difference
 (0.43)  (0.61)  (0.51)  (0.66)  (0.67)  
Note:  * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test 
  + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
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Table 9. Exhaustive Expenditures and Time; Sample 1979(3)-1992(1) 
        
 4qtrs  6qtrs  8qtrs  10qtrs  12qtrs 
int ercept
Δly
lg
ly( )−1
TIME
Δly TIME*
lg( )*−1 TIME
ly TIME( )*−1
LEAD
 1.3727   2.1030  1.1738  3.6785  4.1221 
 (1.47)  (1.84) + (0.59)  (1.53)  (1.31)  
 -0.5307  -0.4733  -0.7796  -0.4548  0.3701 
 (1.49)  (1.20)  (1.63)  (0.86)  (0.54)  
 -0.2967  -0.3686  -0.2562  -0.4682  -0.4701 ( )−1
 (2.29) * (2.50) * (1.12)  (1.70) + (1.32)  
 0.1453  0.1460  0.1264  0.0976  0.0600 
 (3.09) * (3.04) * (2.42) * (1.59)  (0.77)  
 -1.0056  -2.0650  -0.1113  -2.2913  -2.8448 
 (0.71)  (1.40)  (0.05)  (0.92)  (0.89)  
 0.2178  0.3398  0.4431  -0.0249  -0.9340 
 (0.28)  (0.52)  (0.66)  (0.41)  (1.29) 
 0.3507  0.3200  -0.0466  0.0668  0.1430 
 (1.24)  (1.23)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.39) 
 -0.2245  -0.1056  0.0516  0.1400  0.1210 
 (1.40)  (0.78)  (0.44)  (1.60)  (1.32) 
 0.0001  0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0005 
 (0.11)  (0.37)  (1.30)  (1.73) + (1.61) 
adjusted  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.20  0.22  R2
RSS 0.0109  0.0111  0.0111  0.0096  0.0094  
Log-likelihood 143.1153  142.5652  142.6409  146.3850  146.9120  
DW 2.25  2.06  2.16  2.22  2.39 
SC(4) 4.72  2.06  2.26  4.96  10.12  
FF(1) 0.18  0.89  0.18  1.72  2.29 
N(2) 4.79  6.33  1.84  0.78  4.80  
H(1) 0.04  0.06  0.57  0.50  0.11  
DF(res) 7.99 * 7.25 * 7.63 * 7.88 * 8.71 * 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are (absolute) t-values.  
 DF relates to test of non-stationarity in the regression residuals 
 * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test  
 + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
 SC, FF, N, relates to tests of serial correlation, functional form and heteroskedasticity which 
 follows a χ 2 distribution 
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Table 10. Elasticities from Exhaustive Expenditure Model 
           
 4qtrs  6qtrs  8qtrs  10qtrs  12qtrs  
 
 0.4897  0.3961  0.4934  0.2085  0.1277 
η  (4.00) * (3.85) * (1.47)  (2.01) * (1.04)  y
 1.4655  0.8304  0.5879  0.5920  0.5536 
 (0.33)  (0.55)  (4.63) * (7.42) * (6.70) * 
 -0.9758  -0.4343  -0.0944  -0.3835  -0.4259 difference
 (0.22)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (2.97) * (2.87) * 
Notes:  * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for a 2 tailed-test 
  + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level for a 2 tailed-test 
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Table 11. Electoral security and Elasticity of Government Expenditures 
 
Expenditure ηηy  u  
Total Greater pre-election 
10 and 12 quarters 
No significant difference
Transfers Greater pre-election 
8 quarters 
No significant difference
Exhaustive Greater pre-election 
10 and 12 quarters 
- Not applicable - 
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